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Abstract
In this paper we present optimization problems with biconvex objective func-
tion and linear constraints such that the set of global minima of the optimization
problems is the same as the set of Nash eqilibria of a n-player general-sum normal
form game. We further show that the objective function is an invex function and
consider a projected gradient descent algorithm. We prove that the projected gra-
dient descent scheme converges to a partial optimum of the objective function. We
also present simulation results on certain test cases showing convergence to a Nash
equilibrium strategy.
1 Introduction
A general theory of games first introduced in [1] has found several applications in the
field of economics and engineering. A solution concept or a notion of equilibrium was
proposed by Nash (known as Nash equilibrium) in [2] and was shown to exist in every
finite normal-form game. Further generalizations of Nash equilibrium such as correlated
equilibrium and coarse correlated equilibrium were also introduced and studied. It is well
known that for every game the set correlated and coarse-correlated equilibria are convex
subsets of the strategy space. But in general the set of Nash equilibria is not convex. A
number of methods have been proposed to compute a Nash equilibium strategy. Lemke-
Howson’s algorithm for bi-matrix games[3], global newton method[4], homotopy based
methods[5] are some of the few methods to compute a Nash equilibrium strategy.
For a general n-player game, the associated optimization problem is non-linear and
non-convex and hence is difficult to solve. It is known that the problem of computing nash
equilibria in bi-matrix games is a linear complementarity problem and for the general
n-player scenario it is a non-linear complementarity problem. Linear complimentarity
problems (the ones arising from games) can be solved using Lemke-Howson’s method,
while non-linear complimentarity problems are in general hard to solve and require some
sufficient conditions to be imposed on the problem to solve them which is not satisfied
by every game.
In this paper we present optimization problems with biconvex objective function and
linear constraints such that the set of global minima of the optimization problems is the
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same as the set of Nash eqilibria of a n-player general-sum normal form game. Global
optimization algorithms exist that can compute the global minima of such optimization
problems[6]. The main idea in the formulation of these optimization problems is the fact
that correlated or coarse-correlated equilibrium which are product of individual player’s
strategy is a Nash equilibrium. We further show that the objective function is an invex
function i.e. the set of stationary points is the same as the set of global minima. We
also consider a projected gradient descent scheme and prove that is converges to a partial
optimum of the objective function.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: In section 2, necessary definitions
and notations are stated. In section 3, functions with required properties are defined.
In section 4, properties of the functions defined in section 2 are proved. In section
5, optimization problems are presented. In section 6, the projected gradient descent
algorithm is stated and convergence analysis is performed. In section 7, simulation results
of the projected gradient descent algorithm on certain test cases are presented. In section
8, we summarize and present directions for future research.
2 Definitions and notations.
In this section we shall state definitions, introduce variables and notations used later in
this paper.
A normal form game (or simply a game) (Γ) is defined by tuple Γ =< I, {Ai}i∈I , {ui}i∈I >
where, I denotes the set of players (I = {1, . . . , N}), ∀i ∈ I, Ai denotes the set of actions
of player i (Ai = {aij : 1 ≤ j ≤ mi}). Let A = ×i∈IAi and ∀i ∈ I, ui : A → R denotes
the utility function of player i.
For every i ∈ I, Σi denotes the set of probability distributions on Ai. Σi is identified
by the probability simplex 4mi ⊆ Rmi . pii = (pii(ai1), . . . , pii(aimi)) denotes a generic
element of Σi. Let pi =< pi1, . . . , pimi > which is identified as a vector in ×i∈I4mi ⊆ RM1
where M1 =
∑
i∈I
mi. Let Σ = ×i∈IΣi.
Let ΣC denote the set of probability distributions on A. ΣC is identified by the
probability simplex 4M2 ⊆ RM2 where M2 =
∏
i∈I
mi. p = (p(a) : a ∈ A) denotes a generic
element in ΣC .
For every i ∈ I, A−i = ×{k∈I, k 6=i}Ak and a−i denotes a generic element in A−i.
Similarly, this can be extended to more than one player. ∀i ∈ I, ∀a−i = (akjk : k ∈
I, k 6= i, akjk ∈ Ak) ∈ A−i, ∀aiji ∈ Ai, (aiji , a−i) = (a1j1 , . . . , ai−1ji−1 , aiji , ai+1ji+1 , . . . , aNjN ) ∈
A. Similarly define ∀i ∈ I, Σ−i = ×{k∈I, k 6=i}Σk and pi−i denote a generic element in
Σ−i. ∀i ∈ I, ∀pi−i = (pik : k ∈ I, k 6= i, pik ∈ Σk) ∈ Σ−i, ∀pii ∈ Σi, (pii, pi−i) =
(pi1, . . . , pii−1, pii, pii+1, . . . , piN) ∈ Σ.
For every i ∈ I, ui(pi) = ∑
a∈A
ui(a)
∏
i∈I
pii(aiji) where a = (a
i
ji
: i ∈ I). For every i ∈ I,
∀aij ∈ Ai, ∀pi−i ∈ Σ−i, ui(aij, pi−i) =
∑
a−i∈A−i
ui(aij, a
−i)
∏
k∈I, k 6=i
pik(akjk) where a
−i = (akjk :
k ∈ I, k 6= i).
For every i ∈ I, ui(p) = ∑
a∈A
ui(a)p(a) and ∀aiji ∈ Ai, ui(aiji , p−i) =
∑
a−i∈A−i
ui(aiji , a
−i)
mi∑
j=1
p(aij, a
−i).
Similarly define ∀i ∈ I, ∀pii ∈ Σi, ∀p ∈ ΣC , ui(pii, p−i) =
mi∑
j=1
ui(aij, p
−i)pii(aij).
pi ∈ Σ is said to be a Nash equilibrium strategy of the game Γ (or just N.E.) if
2
∀i ∈ I, ∀aij ∈ Ai, ui(aij, pi−i) − ui(pi) ≤ 0. Let NE(Γ) denote the set of Nash equilibria
strategies of game Γ.
p ∈ ΣC is said to be a correlated equilibrium strategy of the game Γ (or just C.E.)
if ∀i ∈ I, ∀aij, aij′ ∈ Ai,
∑
a−i∈A−i
(ui(ai
j′ , a
−i)−ui(aij, a−i))p(aij, a−i) ≤ 0. Let CE(Γ) denote
the set of correlated equilibria of the game Γ.
p ∈ ΣC is said to be a coarse correlated equilibrium strategy of the game Γ (or
just C.C.E.) if ∀i ∈ I, ∀aij ∈ Ai, u(aij, p−i) − ui(p) ≤ 0. Let CCE(Γ) denote the set of
coarse correlated equilibria of the game Γ.
Define P : Σ → ΣC , s.t. , ∀ pi ∈ Σ, ∀ a ∈ A, P (pi)(a) =
∏
i∈I pi
i(aiji) where a =
(aiji : i ∈ I). Let the graph of the function P be G(P ) := {(pi, p) ∈ Σ× ΣC : p = P (pi)}.
In the following lemma we summarize the relationship between the various equilibrium
concepts defined.
Lemma 2.1: Given a game Γ. The following hold.
(1) P (NE(Γ)) ⊆ CE(Γ) ⊆ CCE(Γ).
(2) p ∈ CE(Γ), ∃pi ∈ Σ, s.t., p = P (pi), then, pi ∈ NE(Γ).
(3) p ∈ CCE(Γ), ∃pi ∈ Σ, s.t., p = P (pi), then, pi ∈ NE(Γ).
The results in lemma follow directly from definitions.
(pi, p) ∈ Σ×ΣC is a Nash equilibrium profile of game Γ if pi is a Nash equilibrium
strategy of game Γ and p = P (pi).
Let A1 and A2 be two convex subsets of Rn1 and Rn2 respectively. A function g :
A1 × A2 → R is said to be a biconvex function if ∀x ∈ A1, g(x, ·) : A2 → R is a
convex function and ∀y ∈ A2, g(·, y) : A1 → R is a convex function. (x∗, y∗) ∈ A1 × A2
is a partial optimum of a biconvex function g if ∀x ∈ A1, g(x∗, y∗) ≤ g(x, y∗) and
∀y ∈ A2, g(x∗, y∗) ≤ g(x∗, y). For a detailed study of biconvex functions see [7].
Let F be a subset of Rn and g : F → R. x∗ ∈ F is said to the global optimum of the
optimization problem minx g(x), subject to, x ∈ F , if, ∀x ∈ F , g(x∗) ≤ g(x).
3 Objective functions.
In this section we shall define functions whose set of zeros is the same as the set of Nash
equilibria of the game Γ. The following theorem gives a necessary and sufficient condition
for (pi, p) ∈ Σ× ΣC to be in G(P ).
Theorem 3.1: Given (pi, p) ∈ Σ × ΣC . Then, (pi, p) ∈ G(P ) iff ∀i ∈ I, ∀a ∈
A, p(a)− pii(aiji)
∑mi
j=1 p(a
i
j, a
−i) = 0, where a = (aiji , a
−i).
Proof : [⇒] Assume (pi, p) ∈ G(P ). Fix i ∈ I, a ∈ A (where a = (akjk : k ∈ I)).
Then p(a) =
∏
k∈I pi
k(akjk) and
∑mi
j=1 p(a
i
j, a
−i) =
∑mi
j=1 pi
i(aij)
∏
k∈I
k 6=i
pik(akjk) =∏
k∈I
k 6=i
pik(akjk)
∑mi
j=1 pi
i(aij) =
∏
k∈I
k 6=i
pik(akjk). Therefore p(a) − pii(aiji)
∑mi
j=1 p(a
i
j, a
−i) =∏
k∈I pi
k(akjk) − pii(aiji)
∏
k∈I
k 6=i
pik(akjk) = 0. Since i ∈ I, a ∈ A are arbitrary, p(a) −
pii(aiji)
∑mi
j=1 p(a
i
j, a
−i) = 0, ∀i ∈ I and ∀a ∈ A.
[⇐] Fix a∗ ∈ A where a∗ = (aij∗i : i ∈ I) = (aij∗i : 1 ≤ i ≤ N). From data, we
know that ∀a−1 ∈ A−1, p(a1j∗1 , a−1) = pi1(a1j∗1 )
∑m1
j1=1
p(a1j1 , a
−1). Using the above, we get,
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∀a−1,2 ∈ A−1,2, ∑m2j2=1 p(a1j∗1 , a2j2, a−1,2) = pi1(a1j∗1 )∑m2j2=1∑m1j1=1 p(a1j1 , a2j2 , a−1,2). From
data, we also know that ∀a−1,2 ∈ A−1,2, p(a1j∗1 , a2j∗2 , a−1,2) = pi2(a2j∗2 )
∑m2
j2=1
p(a1j∗1 , a
2
j2
, a−1,2).
Therefore by substituting for the sum, we get, ∀a−1,2 ∈ A−1,2, p(a1j∗1 , a2j∗2 , a−1,2) =
pi2(a2j∗2 )pi
1(a1j∗1 )
∑m2
j2=1
∑m1
j1=1
p(a1j1 , a
2
j2
, a−1,2). Similarly repeating the above procedure for
actions of the third player we get, ∀a−1,2,3 ∈ A−1,2,3, p(a1j∗1 , a2j∗2 , a3j∗3 , a−1,2,3) =
pi3(a3j∗3 )pi
2(a2j∗2 )pi
1(a1j∗1 )
∑m3
j3=1
∑m2
j2=1
∑m1
j1=1
p(a1j1 , a
2
j2
, a3j3 , a
−1,2,3). Proceeding all the way
upto player N we get, p(a∗) = (
∏
i∈I pi
i(aij∗i ))(
∑mN
jN=1
...
∑m1
j1=1
p(a1j1 , ..., a
N
jN
)). Since p ∈
ΣC , we know that
∑
a∈A p(a) =
∑mN
jN=1
...
∑m1
j1=1
p(a1j1 , ..., a
N
jN
) = 1. Therefore, p(a∗) =∏
i∈I pi
i(aij∗i ). Since a∗ ∈ A is arbitrary, p(a∗) =
∏
i∈I pi
i(aij∗i ) ∀a∗ ∈ A. 
Using the above theorem we now define a non-negative function on Σ×ΣC such that
the function takes the value zero on G(P ) and is positive on G(P )C .
Let f : Σ × ΣC → [0,∞) such that, ∀(pi, p) ∈ Σ × ΣC , f(pi, p) =
∑
i∈I
∑
a∈A
a=(aiji
,a−i)
(p(a) −
pii(aiji)
∑mi
j=1 p(a
i
j, a
−i))2.
Corollary 3.1: Given (pi, p) ∈ Σ× ΣC . Then, f(pi, p) = 0 iff (pi, p) ∈ G(P ).
From the definitions of coarse-correlated equilibrium and correlated equilibrium we
now define the following non-negative functions on ΣC such that they take the value zero
on the set of coarse-correlated equilibria (CCE(Γ)) and correlated equilibria (CE(Γ))
respectively.
Let C1 : ΣC → [0,∞), such that, ∀p ∈ ΣC , C1(p) =
∑
i∈I
mi∑
j=1
(max{u(aij, p−i)−ui(p), 0})2
and C2 : ΣC → [0,∞), such that, ∀p ∈ ΣC ,
C2(p) =
∑
i∈I
mi∑
j=1
mi∑
j′=1
(max{ ∑
a−i∈A−i
(ui(ai
j′ , a
−i)− ui(aij, a−i))p(aij, a−i), 0}2.
Lemma 3.1: Given p ∈ ΣC .
• C1(p) = 0 iff p ∈ CCE(Γ).
• C2(p) = 0 iff p ∈ CE(Γ).
Proof : Follows directly from the definitions of correlated equilibrium and coarse corre-
lated equilibrium in section 2. 
Let B : Σ × ΣC → [0,∞) s.t. ∀(pi, p) ∈ Σ × ΣC , B(pi, p) =
∑
i∈I
mi∑
j=1
(max{u(aij, p−i) −
ui(pii, p−i), 0})2. The idea is that when (pi, p) ∈ G(P ) and B(pi, p) = 0, then, ∀i ∈ I, pii is
a best response to pi−i.
Lemma 3.2: Given (pi, p) ∈ G(P ). B(pi, p) = 0 iff pi is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof : [⇒]Since B(pi, p) = 0, we have, ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}, max{u(aij, p−i) −
ui(pii, p−i), 0} = 0. Hence ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}, u(aij, p−i) − ui(pii, p−i) ≤ 0.
Since (pi, p) ∈ G(P ), ui(aij, p−i) = ui(aij, pi−i) and ui(pii, p−i) = ui(pii, pi−i). Therefore,
∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}, u(aij, pi−i) − ui(pii, pi−i) ≤ 0, which by definition of a Nash
equilibrium strategy in section 2, implies pi is Nash equilibrium.
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[⇐] Since pi is a Nash equilibrium, we have, ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}, u(aij, pi−i) −
ui(pii, pi−i) ≤ 0. Since (pi, p) ∈ G(P ), ui(aij, p−i) = ui(aij, pi−i) and ui(pii, p−i) = ui(pii, pi−i).
Therefore, ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}, u(aij, p−i) − ui(pii, p−i) ≤ 0, which further implies,
∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}, max{u(aij, p−i)− ui(pii, p−i), 0} = 0. Thus B(pi, p) = 0. 
We now characterise the set of nash equilibria of a game (Γ) using the functions
f, B, C1 and C2.
Theorem 3.2: Given (pi, p) ∈ Σ× ΣC .
(1) (pi, p) is a Nash equilibrium profile iff f(pi, p) + C1(p) = 0.
(2) (pi, p) is a Nash equilibrium profile iff f(pi, p) + C2(p) = 0.
(3) (pi, p) is a Nash equilibrium profile iff f(pi, p) +B(pi, p) = 0.
Proof : First we shall prove (1).[⇒] Assume (pi, p) is a Nash equilibrium. Then, by
definition of Nash equilibrium profile in section 2, pi is a N.E. and p = P (pi). By lemma
2.1, since pi is a N.E. P (pi) = p ∈ CCE(Γ) and since p = P (pi), (pi, p) ∈ G(P ). Thus
f(pi, p) = 0 and C1(p) = 0 by Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 3.1 respectively. Therefore
f(pi, p) + C1(p) = 0.
[⇐] Assume f(pi, p) + C1(p) = 0. Since both f and C1 are non-negative, f(pi, p) = 0 and
C1(p) = 0. By Theorem 3.1, f(pi, p) = 0 will imply (pi, p) ∈ G(P ) and by Lemma 3.1
C1(p) = 0 will imply p ∈ CCE(Γ). Since p ∈ CCE(p) and p = P (pi), from Lemma 2.1,
we have that pi is a N.E. Thus (pi, p) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of (2) is similar to that of (1) and the proof of (3) follows from Lemma 3.2 and
corollary 3.1. 
4 Properties of the objective functions.
In this section we shall prove certain properties of the functions constructed in section
no. First, we shall prove that f is biconvex and that C1 and C2 are convex.
Lemma 4.1: f is a biconvex function i.e. ∀pi ∈ Σ, f(pi, .) : ΣC → [0,∞) is convex
and ∀p ∈ ΣC , f(., p) : Σ→ [0,∞) is convex.
Proof : ∀i ∈ I, ∀a ∈ A where a = (aiji : i ∈ I), p(a) − pii(aiji)
∑mi
j=1 p(a
i
j, a
−i) is a
linear function of p ∈ ΣC and an affine function of pi ∈ Σ. By proposition 1.1.4 in [9],
(p(a)−pii(aiji)
∑mi
j=1 p(a
i
j, a
−i))2 is convex in p ∈ ΣC and pi ∈ Σ with the other fixed. Since
sum of convex functions is convex, f(pi, p) =
∑
i∈I
∑
a∈A
a=(aiji
,a−i)
(p(a)− pii(aiji)
∑mi
j=1 p(a
i
j, a
−i))2
is convex in p for every fixed pi ∈ Σ and is convex in pi for every fixed p ∈ ΣC . 
Lemma 4.2: C1 and C2 are convex functions of p ∈ ΣC .
Proof : First we shall show C1 is convex. ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}, u(aij, p−i)− ui(p) is
linear in p ∈ ΣC . Since supremum of convex functions is convex, we have, ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈
{1, . . . ,mi}, max{u(aij, p−i)−ui(p), 0}. Since composition of nondecreasing function and
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convex function is convex, ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}, max{u(aij, p−i)−ui(p), 0}2, is convex.
Therefore, C1(p) =
∑
i∈I
mi∑
j=1
(max{u(aij, p−i)− ui(p), 0})2 is a convex function.
Similarly we can show that C2 is also a convex function. 
It is easy to show f, C1 and C2 are continuously differentiable on an open set
containing their respective domains (for a similar proof refer [10]). Let ∇f(pi, p) =
[∇pif(pi, p)T ∇pf(pi, p)T ]T , where ∇pif(pi, p) = (∂f(pi,p)∂pii(aij) : i ∈ I, 1 ≤ j ≤ mi) and
∇pf(pi, p) = (∂f(pi,p)∂p(a) : a ∈ A). For every k ∈ I, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,mk},
∂f(pi, p)
∂pik(akj )
=
∑
i∈I
∑
a∈A
a=(aiji
,a−i)
∂
∂pik(akj )
(p(a)− pii(aiji)
mi∑
jˆ=1
p(ai
jˆ
, a−i))2
=
∑
a∈A
a=(akjk
,a−k)
∂
∂pik(akj )
(p(a)− pii(akjk)
mk∑
jˆ=1
p(ak
jˆ
, a−k))2
= −2[
∑
a−k∈A−k
(p(akj , a
−k)− pii(akjk)
mk∑
jˆ=1
p(ak
jˆ
, a−k))
mk∑
jˆ=1
p(ak
jˆ
, a−k)]
So as to compute ∇pf(pi, p), we shall write f(pi, p) =
∑
i∈I
∑
a∈A
a=(aiji
,a−i)
(hi,a(pi)Tp)2, where
hi,a(pi) ∈ RM2 s.t. ∀i ∈ I, ∀a ∈ A, p(a) − pii(aiji)
∑mi
j=1 p(a
i
j, a
−i) = hi,a(pi)Tp (which is
possible since p(a)− pii(aiji)
∑mi
j=1 p(a
i
j, a
−i) is linear in p). Therefore,
∇pf(pi, p) =
∑
i∈I
∑
a∈A
a=(aiji
,a−i)
∇p(hi,a(pi)Tp)2
= 2
∑
i∈I
∑
a∈A
a=(aiji
,a−i)
(hi,a(pi)Tp)hi,a(pi)
The following lemma says that set of partial optima of f , the set of stationary points
of f and the set of global minima of f are all the same.
Lemma 4.3: Given (pi∗, p∗) ∈ Σ× ΣC . Then the following are equivalent.
(1) (pi∗, p∗) is a partial optimum of f .
(2) (pi∗, p∗) is s.t. f(pi, p) = 0.
(3) (pi∗, p∗) is s.t. ∇f(pi∗, p∗) = 0.
Proof : [(1) ⇒ (2)]. Since (pi∗, p∗) is a partial optimum of f , ∀p ∈ ΣC , f(pi∗, p∗) ≤
f(pi∗, p). Hence, 0 ≤ f(pi∗, p∗) ≤ f(pi∗, P (pi∗)) = 0. Therefore, f(pi∗, p∗) = 0.
[(2) ⇒ (3)]. Since f(pi, p) = 0, ∀i ∈ I, ∀a ∈ A, p(a) − pii(aiji)
∑mi
j=1 p(a
i
j, a
−i) =
0, where a = (aiji , a
−i). Substituting the above in the expression of ∇pif(pi, p) and
∇pf(pi, p) we get, ∇f(pi∗, p∗) = 0.
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[(3) ⇒ (1)]. Since f is biconvex (from Lemma 4.1), f(., p∗) and f(pi∗, .) are con-
vex functions. From proposition 1.1.7 in [9], we get, ∀pi ∈ Σ, f(pi, p∗) ≥ f(pi∗, p∗) +
∇pif(pi∗, p∗)T (pi − pi∗) and ∀p ∈ ΣC , f(pi∗, p) ≥ f(pi∗, p∗) + ∇pf(pi∗, p∗)T (p − p∗). Sub-
stituting ∇f(pi∗, p∗) = [∇pif(pi∗, p∗)T ∇pf(pi∗, p∗)T ]T = 0, will give, ∀pi ∈ Σ, f(pi, p∗) ≥
f(pi∗, p∗) and ∀p ∈ ΣC , f(pi∗, p) ≥ f(pi∗, p∗). Thus, (pi∗, p∗) is a partial optimum of f . 
So as to compute ∇pC1(p), we shall write C1(p) =
∑
i∈I
mi∑
j=1
(max{(gi,j)Tp, 0})2 where
∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}, gi,j ∈ RM2 , s.t., (gi,j)Tp = u(aij, p−i)− ui(p) (which is possible
since u(aij, p
−i)− ui(p) is linear in p). Then ∇pC1(p) = 2
∑
i∈I
mi∑
j=1
(max{(gi,j)Tp, 0})gi,j.
The following lemma says that the set of global minima of C1 and the set of stationary
points of C1 are the same.
Lemma 4.4: Given p∗ ∈ ΣC . C1(p∗) = 0 iff ∇pC1(p∗) = 0.
Proof : Follows directly from the expression of the gradient and the convexity of C1. 
A similar result can be derived for C2. In what follows in this paper results proved
for C1 can be extended to C2 as well.
In theorem 3.2 we showed that the set of zeros of f(pi, p) + C1(p) is the same as the
set of Nash equilibrium profiles of the game Γ. In the following lemma we show that the
set of zeros of f(pi, p) + C1(p) is the same as the set of stationary points of the function
f(pi, p) + C1(p).
Lemma 4.5: Given (pi∗, p∗) ∈ ΣC . f(pi∗, p∗) + C1(p∗) = 0 iff ∇(f(pi∗, p∗) + C1(p∗)) = 0.
Proof : [⇒] Since f(pi∗, p∗) +C1(p∗) = 0 and that f and C1 are non-negative, will imply
that f(pi∗, p∗) = 0 and C1(p∗) = 0. Thus, ∇f(pi∗, p∗) = [∇pif(pi∗, p∗)T ∇pf(pi∗, p∗)T ]T = 0
and ∇pC1(p∗) = 0 by Lemma 4.3 and 4.4 respectively. Therefore, ∇(f(pi∗, p∗)+C1(p∗)) =
[∇pif(pi∗, p∗)T (∇pf(pi∗, p∗) +∇pC1(p∗))T ]T = 0.
[⇐]Since ∇(f(pi∗, p∗) + C1(p∗)) = [∇pif(pi∗, p∗)T (∇pf(pi∗, p∗) + ∇pC1(p∗))T ]T = 0,
we have ∇pf(pi∗, p∗) +∇pC1(p∗) = 0. (∇pf(pi∗, p∗) +∇pC1(p∗))Tp∗ = ∇pf(pi∗, p∗)Tp∗ +
∇pC1(p∗)Tp∗ = 0. By substituting the expressions for ∇pf(pi∗, p∗) and ∇pC1(p∗) we get,
∇pf(pi∗, p∗)Tp∗ = {2
∑
i∈I
∑
a∈A
(hi,a(pi∗)Tp∗)hi,a(pi∗)}Tp∗ = 2∑
i∈I
∑
a∈A
(hi,a(pi∗)Tp∗)2 = 2f(pi∗, p∗)
and∇pC1(p∗)Tp∗ = {2
∑
i∈I
mi∑
j=1
(max{(gi,j)Tp∗, 0})gi,j}Tp∗ = 2∑
i∈I
mi∑
j=1
(max{(gi,j)Tp∗, 0})(gi,j)Tp∗
= 2
∑
i∈I
mi∑
j=1
(max{(gi,j)Tp∗, 0})2 = 2C1(p∗). Therefore , 0 = (∇pf(pi∗, p∗)+∇pC1(p∗))Tp∗ =
∇pf(pi∗, p∗)Tp∗ +∇pC1(p∗)Tp∗ = 2(f(pi∗, p∗) + C1(p∗)). 
Lemma 4.5 shows that the function f(pi, p) + C1(p) is invex. Similarly it can shown
that f(pi, p) + C2(p) is also invex.
In following lemma we show that B is a biconvex function. As a consequence of this
lemma, lemma 4.1 and lemma 3.3 in [7], we get, f(pi, p) +B(pi, p) is a biconvex function.
Lemma 4.6: B is a biconvex function i.e. ∀pi ∈ Σ, B(pi, .) : ΣC → [0,∞) is a con-
vex function and ∀p ∈ ΣC , B(., p) : Σ→ [0,∞) is a convex function.
Proof : Proof is similar to that of Lemma 4.1. 
7
5 Optimization problems.
In this section we shall state the optimization problems obtained using the functions
constructed in the previous sections such that the global minima of the optimization
problem correspond to Nash equilibria of the game Γ.
First optimization problem (O.P.1) is stated below:
(O.P.1) : min
(pi,p)
f(pi, p) + C1(p)
subject to :
pii(aij) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,mi},
p(a) ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A,
mi∑
j=1
pii(aij) = 1 ∀i ∈ I,∑
a∈A
p(a) = 1.
The constraints in the above optimization problem ensure that the feasible set is
Σ× ΣC . The second optimization problem (O.P.2) is stated below:
(O.P.2) : min
(pi,p)
f(pi, p) +B(pi, p)
subject to :
pii(aij) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,mi},
p(a) ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A,
mi∑
j=1
pii(aij) = 1 ∀i ∈ I,∑
a∈A
p(a) = 1.
The following theorem says that the set of global minima of the optimization problem
(O.P.1) is the same as the set of Nash equilibria profiles of the game Γ.
Theorem 5.1: For every game Γ, there exists (pi∗, p∗) ∈ Σ×ΣC s.t. f(pi∗, p∗)+C1(p∗) =
0. Further given (pi∗, p∗) ∈ ΣC , f(pi∗, p∗) + C1(p∗) = 0 iff (pi∗, p∗) is a Nash equilibrium
profile.
Proof : Since for every game there exists pi∗ ∈ Σ, s.t., pi∗ is a N.E. (see [2]). Thus by
theorem 3.2, (pi∗, p∗) with p∗ = P (pi∗) satisfies f(pi∗, p∗) + C1(p∗) = 0. The other part
follows directly from theorem 3.2. 
A similar claim can be proved for O.P.2.
The above two optimization problems have a biconvex objective function with con-
vex (linear) constraints. Global optimization algorithm exists that solves the above two
optimization problems (see [6]).
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6 The projected gradient descent algorithm and its
convergence analysis.
In this section we shall consider a projected gradient descent algorithm to solve O.P.1.
The algorithm is stated below:
Input:
• < pi0, p0 > : initial point for the algorithm,
• Γ : the underlying game,
• {a(n)}n≥1: step size sequences chosen as follows:
– ∀n, a(n) > 0,
–
∑∞
n=1
a(n) =∞,
–
∑∞
n=1
a2(n) <∞,
• H(·) : projection operator ensuring that (pi, p) remains in Σ× ΣC .
Output : After sufficiently large number of iterations(lim) the algorithm outputs the
terminal strategy (pi∗, p∗).
The Algorithm :
n← 0, the iteration index
while(n ≤ lim)(
pin+1
pn+1
)
= H
((pin
pn
)
− a(n)
( ∇pif(pin, pn)
∇p(f(pin, pn) + C1(pn))
))
n← n+ 1
end while
In what follows we shall present the convergence analysis of the above projected gra-
dient descent algorithm. We shall analyse the behaviour of the above algorithm using the
O.D.E. method presented in [12]. In order to use the results from [12], we need the gradi-
ent function to be lipschitz continuous on Σ×ΣC , which is proved in the following lemma.
Lemma 6.1: There exists L > 0, s.t., ∀ (pi1, p1), (pi2, p2) ∈ Σ× ΣC ,
||
( ∇pif(pi1, p1)
∇p(f(pi1, p1) + C1(p1))
)
−
( ∇pif(pi2, p2)
∇p(f(pi2, p2) + C1(p2))
)
|| ≤ L||
(
pi1
p1
)
−
(
pi2
p2
)
||
Proof : It is easy to see that the function f(·) is twice continuously differentiable
on an open set containing Σ × ΣC . Thus ∇f(·) is continuously diffrentiable on Σ ×
ΣC . Hence ||∇2f(·)|| ≤ L1 for some L1 > 0. By mean value theorem, we have, ∇f(·)
is Lipschitz continous with Lipschitz constant L1. Let α := max
(i,j) : i∈I, aij∈Ai
||gi,j||. Fix
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(pi1, p1), (pi2, p2) ∈ Σ × ΣC . Clearly, ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}, |max{(gi,j)Tp1, 0} −
max{(gi,j)Tp2, 0}| ≤ |(gi,j)T (p1 − p2)|. Therefore, we have,
||∇C1(p1)−∇C1(p2)|| ≤
∑
(i,j)
||gi,j|||max{(gi,j)Tp1, 0} −max{(gi,j)Tp2, 0}|
≤ α
∑
(i,j)
|(gi,j)T (p1 − p2)|
≤ α
∑
(i,j)
||gi,j||||(p1 − p2)||
≤ α2
∑
(i,j)
||(p1 − p2)||
= α2β||(p1 − p2)||
where β = |×i∈I
[{i}×{1, . . . ,mi}]|. Since ||p1−p2|| = √||p1 − p2||2 ≤√||pi1 − pi2||2 + ||p1 − p2||2,
we have, ||∇C1(p1) − ∇C1(p2)|| ≤ L2||(pi1, p1) − (pi2, p2)||, where L2 := α2β. Since sum
of two lipschitz continuous functions is lipschitz continuous, we have, ∇(f(·) + C1(·)) is
lipschitz continous with lipschitz constant L := L1 + L2. 
In order to study the asymptotic behaviour of the recursion presented in the algorithm,
by results in Section 3.4 of [12], it is enough to study the asymptotic behaviour of the
o.d.e., (
p˙i
p˙
)
= γ
((pi
p
)
;−
( ∇pif(pi, p)
∇p(f(pi, p) + C1(p))
))
(1)
where ∀v ∈ Σ×ΣC , ∀d ∈ RM1+M2 , γ(v; d) = lim
δ→0
H(v+δd)−v
δ
i.e. the directional derivative
of H(·) at v along the direction d. The above o.d.e. is well posed i.e. has a unique
solution for every initial point in Σ× ΣC (for a proof see [12]).
Σ×ΣC , is a cartesian product of simplices and hence the projection of (pˆi, pˆ) ∈ RM1+M2
on to Σ × ΣC is the same as projection of pˆii on to Σi, ∀i ∈ I and pˆ on to ΣC i.e.
H((pˆiT , pˆT )T ) = [Hm1(pˆi
1)T , . . . , HmN (pˆi
N)T , HM2(pˆ)
T ]T where ∀n ∈ N, Hn(·) denotes
the projection operator which projects every vector in Rn on to 4n ⊆ Rn. Thus, in order
to compute the directional derivative of H(·), it is enough to consider the directional
derivative of the projection operator on to individual simplices and then juxtaposing
them would give us the directional derivative of H(·).
The computation of the directional derivative of a projection operation on to a simplex
can be found in [12] which we shall state here. Let ∀v ∈ 4n, ∀d ∈ Rn, γn(v; d) :=
lim
δ→0
Hn(v+δd)−v
δ
and η(v) := {x ∈ Rn : ||x|| = 1, 〈x, v − vˆ〉 ≤ 0, ∀vˆ ∈ 4n}. Then,
γn(v; d) = d+ (max{〈d,−xn〉, 0})xn (2)
where xn ∈ η(v), s.t., ∀x ∈ η(v), 〈d,−xn〉 ≥ 〈d,−x〉.
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Let ∀(pi, p) ∈ Σ × ΣC , V (pi, p) := f(pi, p) + C1(p). Fix (pi0, p0) ∈ Σ × ΣC be a initial
point of the o.d.e. 1 and the corresponding unique solution be (pi(t), p(t)). Then,
dV (pi(t), p(t))
dt
= ∇V (pi(t), p(t))Tγ((pi
p
)
;−
(
∇pif(pi, p)
∇p(f(pi, p) + C1(p))
))
=
∑
i∈I
∇piiV (pi(t), p(t))Tγmi
(
pii;−∇pii(f(pi, p) + C1(p))
)
+∇pV (pi(t), p(t))TγM2
(
p;−∇p(f(pi, p) + C1(p))
)
By substituing 2 and the fact that ∀(pi, p) ∈ Σ×ΣC , ∇V (pi, p) = ∇(f(pi, p) + C1(p))
in the above equation we get,
dV (pi(t), p(t))
dt
≤
∑
i∈I
(−||∇piif(pi, p)||2 + |〈∇piif(pi, p), xmi〉|2)
+ (−||∇p(f(pi, p) + C1(p))||2 + |〈∇p(f(pi, p) + C1(p)), xM2〉|2)
≤0.
where the last inequality follows from the application of cauchy schwartz and the fact
that ∀n ∈ N, ||xn|| = 1.
Therefore along every solution of the o.d.e. 1, the value of the potential function V (·)
reduces and hence the above o.d.e. converges to an internally chain transitive invariant
set contained in L := {(pi∗, p∗) ∈ Σ× ΣC : dV (pi∗,p∗)dt = 0}.
In the following lemma we shall prove that (pi∗, p∗) ∈ L is an equilibrium point of
o.d.e. 1.
Lemma 6.2: If (pi∗, p∗) ∈ L, then, γ((pi∗
p∗
)
;−
(
∇pif(pi∗, p∗)
∇p(f(pi∗, p∗) + C1(p∗))
))
= 0.
Proof : If (pi∗, p∗) ∈ L is such that∇(f(pi∗, p∗)+C1(p∗)) = 0, then γ((pi∗, p∗);∇(f(pi∗, p∗)+
C1(p
∗))) = 0. Assume∇(f(pi∗, p∗)+C1(p∗)) 6= 0. Since (pi∗, p∗) ∈ L,
∑
i∈I
(−||∇piif(pi, p)||2+
|〈∇piif(pi, p), xmi〉|2) + (−||∇p(f(pi, p) + C1(p))||2 + |〈∇p(f(pi, p) + C1(p)), xM2〉|2) = 0.
By cauchy schwartz inequality, ∀i ∈ I, (−||∇piif(pi, p)||2 + |〈∇piif(pi, p), xmi〉|2) ≤ 0
and (−||∇p(f(pi, p) + C1(p))||2 + |〈∇p(f(pi, p) + C1(p)), xM2〉|2) ≤ 0. Since their sum
is zero, we get, ∀i ∈ I, (−||∇piif(pi, p)||2 + |〈∇piif(pi, p), xmi〉|2) = 0 and (−||∇p(f(pi, p) +
C1(p))||2 + |〈∇p(f(pi, p) + C1(p)), xM2〉|2) = 0. Hence, ∀i ∈ I, xmi = ± ∇piif(pi
∗,p∗)
||∇piif(pi∗,p∗)||
and
xM2 = ± ∇p(f(pi
∗,p∗)+C1(p∗))
||∇p(f(pi∗,p∗)+C1(p∗))|| . By, definition of xn in equation 2, we get, ∀i ∈ I, xmi =
∇piif(pi∗,p∗)
||∇piif(pi∗,p∗)||
and xM2 =
∇p(f(pi∗,p∗)+C1(p∗))
||∇p(f(pi∗,p∗)+C1(p∗))|| . Substituing for xmi and xM2 in the expres-
sion for γmi((pi
i)∗;−∇pii(f(pi∗, p∗) + C1(p∗))) and γM2(p∗;−∇p(f(pi∗, p∗) + C1(p∗))) and
using the fact that γ((pi∗, p∗);−∇(f(pi∗, p∗) + C1(p∗))) = [(γm1((pi1)∗;−∇pi1(f(pi∗, p∗) +
C1(p
∗))))T , . . . , (γmN ((pi
N)∗;−∇piN (f(pi∗, p∗)+C1(p∗))))T , (γM2(p∗;−∇p(f(pi∗, p∗)+C1(p∗))))T ]T
we get the desired result. 
In fact the converse is also true and the proof is similar to that of the previous lemma.
Therefore L = E where E denotes the set of equilibrium points of o.d.e.1. The following
lemma says that every point in the set L is a partial optimum of the biconvex function
f(pi, p) + C1(p).
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Lemma 6.3: (pi∗, p∗) ∈ L, then, ∀pi ∈ Σ, f(pi∗, p∗) + C1(p∗) ≤ f(pi, p∗) + C1(p∗) and
∀p ∈ ΣC , f(pi∗, p∗) + C1(p∗) ≤ f(pi∗, p) + C1(p).
Proof : If (pi∗, p∗) ∈ L is such that ∇(f(pi∗, p∗) + C1(p∗)) = 0, then by lemma 4.5
the result follows. Assume ∇(f(pi∗, p∗) + C1(p∗)) 6= 0. Then by lemma 6.2 we have,
∀i ∈ I, xmi = ∇piif(pi
∗,p∗)
||∇piif(pi∗,p∗)||
and xM2 =
∇p(f(pi∗,p∗)+C1(p∗))
||∇p(f(pi∗,p∗)+C1(p∗))|| .
By equation 2, xM2 ∈ η(p∗) and hence ∀p ∈ ΣC , 〈 ∇p(f(pi
∗,p∗)+C1(p∗))
||∇p(f(pi∗,p∗)+C1(p∗))|| , p
∗ − p〉 ≤ 0.
Therefore ∀p ∈ ΣC , 〈∇p(f(pi∗, p∗) +C1(p∗)), p− p∗〉 ≥ 0. By convexity of f(pi∗, ·) +C1(·)
and proposition 1.1.8 in [9], we get ∀p ∈ ΣC , f(pi∗, p∗) + C1(p∗) ≤ f(pi∗, p) + C1(p).
By equation 2, ∀i ∈ I, xmi ∈ η(pii∗) and hence ∀i ∈ I, ∀pii ∈ Σi, 〈 ∇piif(pi
∗,p∗)
||∇piif(pi∗,p∗)||
, (pii)∗−
pii〉 ≤ 0. Therefore ∀i ∈ I, ∀pii ∈ Σi, 〈∇piif(pi∗, p∗), pii − (pii)∗〉 ≥ 0. Since ∀pi ∈
Σ, 〈∇pi(f(pi∗, p∗)+C1(p∗)), pi−pi∗〉 = 〈∇pif(pi∗, p∗), pi−pi∗〉 =
∑
i∈I
〈∇piif(pi∗, p∗), pii−(pii)∗〉,
we get, ∀pi ∈ Σ, 〈∇pi(f(pi∗, p∗)+C1(p∗)), pi−pi∗〉 ≥ 0. Thus by convexity of f(·, p∗)+C1(p∗)
and by proposition 1.1.8 in [9], we have, ∀pi ∈ Σ, f(pi∗, p∗) + C1(p∗) ≤ f(pi, p∗) + C1(p∗).

Even though the proof guarantees convergence to the set of partial optimum of the
biconvex function in simulation on various test cases it was observed that the iterates
converge to the set of Nash equilibria of the game Γ.
7 Simulation results.
In the simulations carried out, in order to perform the projection operation in every
iteration we use the procedure in [11].
7.1 Rock-Paper-Scissor :
We consider the following version of the standard rock-paper-scissor game.
R P S
R (0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0)
P (1, 0) (0, 0) (0, 1)
S (0, 1) (1, 0) (0, 0)
In the above game, ((1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
), (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
)) is the only Nash equilibrium strategy. Having
started the algorithm from a random initial point, variation of the objective function
value and the strategies are shown in the plots below.
The plots in Fig:1 show that the action probabilities converge to the Nash equilib-
rium of the game. As the action probabilities converge to Nash equilibrium strategy the
objective function value approaches zero as seen in Fig:2.
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Figure 1: Action probabilities vs iteration index
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7.2 Jordan’s game :
The general form of Jordan’s game can be found in [13]. We consider the following
version.
Player 3 action a31:
a21 a
2
2
a11 (0, 0, 0) (1, 1, 0)
a12 (1, 0, 1) (0, 1, 1)
Player 3 action a32 :
a21 a
2
2
a11 (0, 1, 1) (1, 0, 1)
a12 (1, 1, 0) (0, 0, 0)
In the above game, ((1
2
, 1
2
), (1
2
, 1
2
), (1
2
, 1
2
)) is the only Nash equilibrium strategy. Having
started the algorithm from a random initial point, variation of the objective function
value and the strategies are shown in the plots in Fig:3 and Fig:4.
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Figure 4: Action probabilities/Objective function value vs iteration index
Simulations were also carried out on other versions of this game obtained from the
general form in [13] and convergence to Nash equilibrium was observed.
7.3 A game with finite number of Nash equilibria :
The following game was introduced in [14] in order to show non-convergence of certain
class of algorithms. The game is stated below.
a21 a
2
2 a
2
3
a11 (1, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0)
a12 (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 0)
a13 (0, 1) (0, 1) (1, 1)
In the above game, ((1
2
, 1
2
, 0), (1
2
, 1
2
, 0)) and ((0, 0, 1), (0, 0, 1)) are the two Nash equi-
librium strategies. Having started the algorithm from a random initial point, variation of
the objective function value and the strategies are shown in the plots in Fig:5 and Fig:6.
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Figure 5: Action probabilities vs iteration index
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Figure 6: Objective function value vs iteration index.
7.4 A game with infinite Nash equilibria :
a21 a
2
2
a11 (3, 0) (12, 0)
a12 (3,−2) (2,−5)
In the above game, {((α, 1−α), (1, 0)) : 0 ≤ α ≤ 1}∪{((1, 0), (α, 1−α)) : 0 ≤ α ≤ 1}
is the set of Nash equilbria. Having started the algorithm from a random initial point,
variation of the objective function value and the strategies are shown in the plots in Fig:7
and Fig:8.
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8 Summary and directions for future work.
We have presented optimization problems (O.P.1 and O.P.2) such that the global minima
of these optimization problems are Nash equilibria of the game Γ. The objective functions
were shown to be bi-convex and in case of O.P.1 the objective function was also shown to
be an invex function. We also considered a projected gradient descent scheme and proved
that it converges to a partial optimum of the objective function. Even though the proof
gaurantees convergence to the set of partial optimum in various test cases considered we
have seen convergence to a Nash equilibrium strategy.
In future we wish to extend the above optimization problem formulation to discounted
stochastic games and prove convergence to Nash equilibrium or construct a counter exam-
ple where the algorithm converges to a partial optimum which is not a Nash equilibrium
strategy.
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